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Refocusing Metrics: Can the Sustainable Development Goals help  
break the ‘Metrics Trap’ and  modernise international drug control 
policy?1  
 
David R. Bewley-Taylor 
 
Abstract  
Purpose – This article aims to examine the extent to which the dominant metrics currently 
used to measure the success of the UN based global drug prohibition regime are in many 
ways inadequate and consequently contribute to systemic inertia. Within this context, it seeks 
to explore the potential of explicitly linking drug policy to the recently launched Sustainable 
Development Agenda and the associated Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to initiate 
a change in approach.  
Design/methodology/approach – Framing the topic in terms of International Relations (IR) 
and regime analysis, prominent examples of where current metrics are imprecise (the 
relationship between production and seizures), misconceived (drug use) and missing (a 
range of drug and drug policy related harms) are explored. Attention is then given to an 
examination of international development as a model for measuring drug control outcomes, 
including a discussion of the SDGs in general and the intersection between drug policy 
interventions and several Goals in particular.  
Findings -  While aware of the complexity of the issue area, the article finds that there are 
considerable shortcomings in the way international drug policy outcomes are currently 
assessed.  Although methodological problems are likely to persist, linking drug policy with the 
SDGs and their associated metrics offers the potential to help to shift the focus of 
international policy in a manner that would benefit not only UN system-wide coherence on 
the issue, but also assist in the achievement of the regime’s own overarching goal; to 
safeguard the ‘health and welfare’ of humankind.   
Practical implications – With the next high-level review of international drug policy due to take 
place in 2019, the article offers policy makers with a way to begin to refocus drug policy 
metrics, and subsequently review outcomes, in line with the UN system-wide Sustainable 
Development Agenda.       
Originality – As an emerging domain of inquiry, the article not only explores a hitherto largely 
unexplored – yet increasingly important – facet of UN level policy evaluation, formulation and 
implementation, but also helps to fill a gap in the IR literature on regime dynamics.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In April 2016, the UN held a General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the World 
Drug Problem. During this high-level conference in New York, member states reviewed the 
performance of what can be usefully called the global drug prohibition regime; an almost 
universally accepted treaty-based system currently built on a suite of three UN treaties 
(Nadelmann, 1990).  Dating back to the first decades of the twentieth century, and in its 
current form the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (as amended by the 1972 
Protocol), the regime’s overarching goal is to safeguard the ‘health and welfare’ of 
humankind (UN, 1961).  In so doing it applies a dual imperative: to ensure an adequate 
supply of pharmaceuticals for the licit market – including World Health Organization listed 
essential medicines - and at the same time prevent the non-scientific and non-medical 
production, supply and use of narcotic and psychotropic substances. Within this context, the 
system has been developed on two interconnected tenets.  First, a deeply held belief that the 
best way to protect health and reduce what has become known simply and somewhat 
vaguely as the ‘world drug problem’ and the harms associated with it is to minimize the scale 
of - and ultimately eliminate - the illicit market. And second, that this can be achieved through 
a reliance on prohibition oriented and supply-side dominated measures.  In this way, and 
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 2
while permitting some deviation – or soft defection -  from its authoritative norm, from an 
International Relations (IR) perspective the regime has successfully generated a powerful 
prohibitionist expectancy in relation to how its members approach the non-medical and non-
scientific use of substances scheduled in the UN drug control conventions (Bewley-Taylor, 
2012).  
 
At the UNGASS member states adopted an Outcome Document (UN, 2016).  This, , despite 
some changes in focus (Nougier and Ochoa, 2017), continued in the vein of previous soft law 
instruments in  restating  that the current and well-embedded approach of the regime 
remains largely successful and appropriate to the task at hand (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 
2016). This was the case even though the system has arguably yet to achieve its core goal 
set nearly sixty years ago and reinforced periodically since then: to, in general terms, protect 
health and significantly reduce drug-related problems and associated harms (UN, 1971, 
1988, 1998, 2009, 2014).2 It should be recalled that in 2009, in the last high level Political 
Declaration on the issue, member states reaffirmed that ‘?the ultimate goal of both demand 
and supply reduction strategies and sustainable development strategies is to minimize and 
eventually eliminate the availability and use of illicit drugs and psychotropic substances in 
order to ensure the health and welfare of mankind?’ (UN, 2009)  
 
Increasing evidence concerning the ineffectiveness of the regime in attaining this objective, 
as well as generating a range of ‘unintended consequences’ (CND, 2008, Reuter and 
Trautman, 2009, Rolles et al, 2016, ) including shortcomings in access to essential 
medicines in some parts of the world, raises an obvious question. Why, in the face of 
growing levels of critique, do most states continue to adhere to the current approach?  Or, 
put another way, how, in IR terms, has the regime remained so resilient to formal and 
substantive change? Despite a more sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of illicit 
drug markets and, in some ways the resultant ‘untidy legal justifications’ concerning 
recreational cannabis markets in the Americas (Bewley-Taylor, Blickman & Jelsma, 2014), 
the regime remains underpinned by what have been called ‘Jurassic’ conventions that 
appear to be frozen in time (Haase, 2014).  There are several possible explanations for such 
homeostasis. For example, a ‘tough on drugs’ approach remains politically persuasive in 
many parts of the world with drugs often regarded by authorities as the ‘useful enemy’ 
(Christie and Bruun, 1991).   Moreover, many states must seriously consider the ‘logic of 
consequence’ (March and Olsen, 1998) and a range of potential costs associated with full-
blown defection from the regime (Bewley-Taylor, 2012).  This combines with the nature of the 
rules surrounding treaty alteration to create a sticky nexus of politics and procedure.  And 
finally, as Robert Keohane has pointed out, regimes often persist simply because their 
creation in the first place is so difficult (Keohane, 1984).  
 
With the aim of adding a further dimension to the growing debate around the glacially slow 
formal evolution of the global drug prohibition regime, this article suggests that metrics, 
sometimes referred to here as indicators, also play an important role in preserving its current 
shape and focus ; a dynamic that has been referred to elsewhere as the ‘metrics trap’ 
(Bewley-Taylor, 2016). It will be argued that the current systemic inertia has much to do with 
how drug markets and interventions are measured as well as  what is and what is not 
currently included within assessment processes; processes that having been decided and 
mandated by member states, are carried out by the Vienna based United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Data collected from states through the Annual Report 
Questionnaire (ARQ) and other sources (UNODC, 2016) and presented annually in the 
UNODC’s flagship publication, the World Drug Report, are central to the international 
community’s assessment of progress in tackling the world drug problem and setting the 
‘mood music’ for multinational deliberations.   
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 3
Yet, as will be discussed, the high order metrics used by the UNODC measure key properties 
of illicit markets imprecisely. Some indicators do not measure what they are supposed to 
measure.  And some metrics – which would be crucial for an appropriately holistic 
understanding of the consequences of international drug control relative to its overarching 
goal and other UN system objectives relating, among other things - to human rights - are not 
part of the set of metrics used by the Vienna based agency. These shortcomings result in a 
situation where the currently dominant sets of indicators only partially reflect the reality of the 
successes and failures of the regime. Within this context, it is suggested here that explicitly 
re-focusing drug policy metrics towards the recently launched Sustainable Development 
Agenda (SDA) and the associated Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has the potential 
to  help break the ‘metrics trap’, initiate some form of regime transformation and shift the 
emphasis of international drug control policy to a position more in line with the realities of 
contemporary drug markets and broader UN commitments of member states  Such a 
process  would benefit not only UN system-wide coherence on this issue, but also assist in 
the achievement of the regime’s own overarching goal.  
 
Starting from the position that ‘theories of international regimes’ (Peterson, 2012) and regime 
analysis remain useful to our understanding of areas of multilateral cooperation (Haas, 
2013), the article also aims to help fill a gap in the IR literature on the role of numbers in 
sustaining international norms and related regime architectures. While much work has 
focused on regime formation, there remains a paucity on regime change and the associated 
forces that enable or restrict transformation (Young, 1983, Bewley-Taylor 2012).  In this way, 
it is hoped that the article will go some way in addressing not only criticism concerning a lack 
of attention to the circumstances surrounding the dynamism – or otherwise - of regimes 
(Strange, 1982, Sandholtz and Stiles, 2008), but also Ronen Palan’s question concerning 
why so much time has been devoted to why states form regimes and ‘not enough on whether 
or not regimes are any good’ (Palan, 2012). In examining the role of metrics and indicators 
within the functioning of the global drug prohibition regime, the research here also aims to 
contribute to discussions about regimes as ‘intervening variables’ (Keohane 1984, Krasner, 
1982, Bewley-Taylor, 2012).   Despite some acknowledgement of the limited attention given 
to the examination of the ‘specific role indicators play in policy-making’ and emerging public 
policy literature on the dominance of some metrics over others (for example Howlett and 
Cuenca, 2016), there remains remarkably little attention given to how data restricts policy 
approaches at the UN level (for example Grady, 2016). Rather, the explosion of interest in 
recent years concerning the ‘power of numbers’ relates to the potential to initiate change in 
state and organizational policy approaches via a range of performance indexes (Merry, 2011, 
Davies et al, 2012, Cooley and Snyder, 2015, Rottenberg et al, 2015, Merry et al, 2015, Kelly 
and Simmons, 2015,)  
 
Beyond analysis of a range of UN documents and reports, primary research for this article 
draws heavily on material generated from participant observation, both as a member of non-
governmental organisation and country delegations, at various official UN meetings.  These 
include sessions of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Vienna -- particularly 
2016 and 2017 – and the 2016 UNGASS.  The views contained in the pages that follow are 
also informed by off-the-record discussions and meetings with an array of governmental, 
non-governmental and UN agency actors working within the issue area in both Vienna and 
New York. 
     
Discussion begins with an examination of some of the shortcomings of the current 
international drug policy metrics.  It then moves on to explore how the field of international 
development, specifically the SDA and associated SDGs, might offer a potentially productive 
route through which to change the focus of the existing measurement process, alter the 
objectives of current drug control efforts and ultimately instigate some type of formal regime 
modernization.  
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Imprecise measurements 
 
In an attempt to capture the characteristics of illicit drug markets and structures designed to 
deal with them, the ARQ is divided into a number of sections; (I) Legislative and Institutional 
Framework (II) Comprehensive approach to drug demand and supply reduction (III) Extent 
and patterns in drug use (IV) Extent and patterns of trends in drug crop cultivation and drug 
manufacturing and trafficking).  In line with the traditional focus of the regime, and the 
categories privileged in the ARQ, prominent examples of the role of current metrics in driving 
the dynamics of international drug control concern efforts to control illicit supply; a facet of 
drug control efforts that retain a high profile.  Metrics such as those relating to the quantity of 
drugs seized or hectares of poppy, coca or cannabis crops eradicated, or as is increasingly 
the case drug laboratories destroyed, are frequently used to measure the success of supply 
control.  However, while such actions might be understood as successful police (and in some 
places military) work, and in terms of seizures often generate important market intelligence, it 
is difficult to argue that they also represent a success from the perspective of drug control 
policy. This is because they are measures of governmental, and beneath this agency, 
processes and activity that do not contain meaningful information about the effects, or in 
terms of indicators, the outcomes, of interventions on drug markets.  
 
To be sure, preoccupation with measuring activity and outputs rather than outcomes is 
problematic in several ways.  It reduces the ability to explain causation and, by focusing on 
aggregate data, obscures the distribution of costs and benefits and who incurs the burden of 
policies and interventions. Moreover, in many instances, increased levels of law enforcement 
activity may owe more to political, bureaucratic and financial exigencies than to any direct 
concern for the state of a drug market and the reduction of any associated harms.    To 
achieve success congruent with the overarching goal of the regime, drug law enforcement 
would have to result in not only substantial eradication and seizures, but also influence illicit 
drug markets in a way that significantly reduced the harms related to drug consumption 
(Reuter and Kleiman, 1986) and, although often seen as a secondary concern, drug 
production itself. 
 
While this is the case, even prominently deployed metrics do not stand up to scrutiny when 
assessed in terms of their relationship to the reduction of drug-related harm.  This has much 
to do with the uncertainty that comes with measurement.   Take for example drug seizures.   
At first glance, it seems reasonable so assume that to significantly influence drug markets 
the ratio between the amount of an illicitly produced drug and the amount of that drug seized   
should be as high as possible. To assess success in this regard it is, therefore, necessary to 
know the quantities of illicit drugs produced and then seized; both theoretically quantifiable 
variables.  For instance, in relation to plant-based drugs such as heroin, cocaine or cannabis, 
it is often believed that cultivation can be measured, or at least estimated with a degree of 
confidence via extrapolation, since large-scale open-air crops cannot be hidden. 
Furthermore, according to this logic, because techniques exist to monitor not only the size of 
areas under cultivation but also to determine crop yields it should be possible to provide an 
estimate of the illicit production of a drug, particularly in its pre-processed form, and calculate 
how much of this volume is seized on an annual basis.  
 
In practice, however, there are problems with such a neat set of assumptions. For instance, 
even if satellite or aerial imagery can capture all illicit cultivation, which is unlikely due - 
among other factors - to staggered planting and a range of concealment practices, such an 
approach to measuring illicit drug production is still premised on the assumption that yields 
per hectare, as well as the relationship between yield and the quality (potency) of the final 
product, for example cocaine or heroin, are known and constant over time and place. 
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However, in places where UNODC works, often in collaboration with governments, to collect 
information on drug cultivation that goes beyond measuring areas of drug crops - such as in 
parts of Afghanistan3 – variations in yields per hectare seem to be the rule rather than the 
exception (UNODC, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c).  Temperature, precipitation and fungal 
infestations are among the more prominent factors that influence plant growth and, therefore, 
yield per hectare. This makes collecting data on drug production, including via ‘ground truth’ 
surveys to complement remote imagery, considerably more complicated and – as drug 
production often takes place in contested areas – more risky and estimating volumes more 
complex (Mansfield, 2016). Indeed, in terms of data collection, recent evidence from Bolivia 
in relation to coca suggests that even beyond zones of conflict, the type of legal environment 
in place within production areas can impact the effectiveness of monitoring processes 
(UNDP, 2016, WOLA, 2016)  Another problem with the measurement of production relates to 
distribution.  As touched upon above, since metrics are generally aggregate figures and often 
geographically ‘blind’, they offer few, if any, insights into changes in cultivation over space 
and time and consequently how markets adapt to drug policies, related interventions and 
other exogenous variables.   
 
To account for such uncertainty, the UNODC has since 2010 provided production estimates 
within a substantial interval range.  Admittedly this helps the user of such statistics to better 
assess the reliability of the data provided. However, acknowledging that levels of drug 
production are only known within a range of 30 percent, as is the case with the World Drug 
Report, makes it considerably more difficult to assess seizures in relation to market volumes. 
Margins of error are also deployed in surveys conducted by many national agencies and this 
generates a similar dilemma.  That said, frequent disagreements concerning estimates exist 
between the UNODC and such agencies. Prominent among these is the reoccurring debate 
around figures on coca production promoted by US drug control agencies (both the Bureau 
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the White House Office of 
National Drug Control Policy) and the UN body.  Differences here rest not only on 
methodological approaches and budgets available to conduct surveys, but also arguably 
political imperatives (Reuter, 2009, Youngers and Ledebur, 2015).       
 
For synthetic drugs and increasingly widespread indoor cannabis cultivation – regarding the 
latter, so-called ‘grow-ops’ - estimating manufacture and cultivation respectively is even more 
difficult since remote sensing technologies cannot be used to gauge their scale. The UNODC 
has, therefore, become increasingly cautious in providing estimates concerning the 
production of both drug types. While this is laudable and in the spirit of increasing openness 
in relation to the reliability and availability of data sets, it renders seizure statistics – still 
provided prominently within the World Drug Report and core to the concept of constructive 
market intervention – even more problematic.   
 
Despite this, seizure data are often used by states to demonstrate successes in drug supply 
control within the CND, the UN’s central policy-making body on the issue of drug control.  For 
example, and by no means unique to these sessions, the 2016 and 2017 meetings of the 
CND saw a significant proportion of country statements, particularly those from states in 
Africa, Asia and the Near and Middle East, include lengthy mentions of seizure figures made 
over the previous year as a demonstration of progress towards achieving UN drug policy 
goals set in 2009.   Moreover, it has only been in recent years that country statements at 
international fora have reflected a growing appreciation in various quarters, including UN 
agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and some member states, that 
interventions associated with drug crop eradication and the disruption of drug trafficking 
organizations generate considerable harms, including in relation to market violence and 
human rights violations. In 2016, for instance, among others, the Czech Republic, Jamaica 
and Colombia included this perspective within statements at both the CND and the 
UNGASS.   
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Misconceived metrics  
 
Another headline metric prominently used by the UNODC concerns numbers of drug users. 
For example, in its 2016 World Drug Report the UNODC estimated that, globally, around 247 
million people had consumed at least one illicit drug in 2014 (i.e. past year drug use 
according to the last available data sets) (UNODC, 2016). This type of figure is used 
prominently in its World Drug Reports, the implication being that it proves the existence and 
significance of ‘the ‘world drug problem’. Within recent Reports, and subtly acknowledging a 
paucity of data in many parts of the world, the UNODC observes that this figure has 
remained relatively stable when controlled for overall population growth.  This is a dynamic 
that the UNODC comments upon, if not positively, then at least in a neutral fashion with the 
underlying assumption being that the illicit use of some form of psychoactive substance is a 
constant feature of modern life (Bewley-Taylor and Hallam, 2016). 
 
Depending on perspective, a figure like 247 million might seem remarkable in itself.  In terms 
of scale and a variety of associated harms it might be viewed as vast.  Conversely, at 1 in 20 
adults between the age of 15 and 64 years, it might be seen as evidence of a ‘contained’ 
‘problem’, particularly compared to the number of individuals using the licit psychoactive 
substances of alcohol and tobacco (Bewley-Taylor and Hallam, 2008). Nonetheless, it 
remains largely unclear what can be learnt from it in terms of the outcomes of policies 
focusing on illicit markets.  Because it includes a variety of different drug consumption 
behaviours (from the one-time user to dependent daily users) and does not make a 
distinction between the substances consumed (including those with characteristics as 
different as cannabis, MDMA, amphetamine, methamphetamine, cocaine or heroin), the 
number of past year drug users at a global level is not an especially helpful metric for the 
problems often surrounding drug consumption, including the health and societal harms 
emerging from it.   
 
For instance, in terms of harms, daily heroin injection clearly differs from occasional cannabis 
consumption (Hall and Degenhardt, 2014, Degenhardt, 2013).  In this sense, it can be 
argued that the overall number of annual drug users is not an appropriate measure for the 
extent of the ‘world drug problem’. Moreover, while since 2006 more nuance has been added 
regarding what used to be called ‘problem drug use’ (UNODC, 2006), this disconnect is not 
adequately addressed by the inclusion of figures on what the UNODC now refers to as 
people suffering from ‘drug use disorders’; a group amounting to approximately 29 million 
people in 2014 (UNODC, 2016).This is the case since not all drug consumption – even if 
considered problematic – results in the same amount and sort of harm with the mere number 
of drug consumers with ‘disorders’ doing little to help better understand the extent of the 
health and societal problems often caused by drug consumption. Further, it should be noted 
that a stable  
or even decreasing number of drug consumers does not necessarily indicate a positive policy 
outcome since levels of drug related harm may increase as prevalence decreases, in some 
instances as a response to interventions designed to eliminate the illicit market.  
 
As alluded to above, added to this is the fact that outside of Europe, North America and 
Australasia national estimates of drug consumption are often incomplete, out-of-date and in 
some cases non-existent (UNODC, 2016). Even where data exists the illegality of the market 
leads to a range of methodological problems concerning accuracy.  This concerns overall 
drug use, but pertains even more significantly to problematic drug use and associated harms. 
Consequently, putting aside the enormous gaps in the data in many parts of the world, 
particularly in Africa and Asia, it is possible to question UNODCs statements regarding the 
stability of the number of drug users globally; a point that is noted through a narrative of 
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uncertainty found within the pages of World Drug Reports if not the more prominent foreword 
and executive summary (Bewley-Taylor and Hallam, 2016). Such a situation makes the 
interpretation of this oft-used and prominent figure as a useful metric for drug control policy 
outcomes even more questionable.  As long as measurement of harms in some form 
remains underrepresented in such an assessment, it seems fair to argue that a blunt metric 
concentrating simply on the number of drug consumers globally does not actually measure 
what it implies. While it is true that, where possible, the UNODC does break down its drug 
use analysis into drug types at the regional and sometimes country level, even here there 
remains a lack of necessary granularity.  As with production metrics, while perhaps useful for 
identifying trends, such relatively high order figures do little to assist in better understanding 
what causes changes in drug use patterns in specific places and points in time, including 
crucially responses to different policy interventions.   
 
Missing metrics 
 
In terms of drug related harms, it should be noted that the UNODC has gradually been 
devoting more attention to collecting and presenting data on the ‘health impact’ or 
‘consequences’ of ‘drug use’, including data on people who inject drugs, individuals among 
that group living with infectious diseases (principally HIV and hepatitis C) and drug related 
deaths (UNODC, 2016); all in their own way important and complex measurement domains.  
That said, the list of indicators that might help better understand and assess the outcomes of 
drug control policies, but for which data is not collected systematically by the UN drug control 
apparatus, remains long.  
 
In recent years, NGOs and other bodies increasingly active in international drug control, 
including UN agencies beyond the immediate confines of the drug control framework in 
Vienna such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have repeatedly 
pointed to the fact that the control apparatus’ system of metrics provides a skewed 
perspective on the purpose and goals of international and, beneath that, national drug control 
efforts (Global Commission, 2014, Muggah et al 2015, Bewley-Taylor, 2016, IDPC, 2016, 
ICSDP, 2016, Reuter et al, 2016, UNDP, 2015, 2016).At the centre of this critique is the 
argument that, guided by the overarching philosophy of the global drug prohibition regime, 
the dominant metrics currently collected and presented by the UNODC are primarily 
concerned with measuring the reduction of the scale of illicit drug markets and drug 
consumption. This, as noted above is underpinned by the assumption that shrinking and 
ultimately eliminating such markets will reduce harms most effectively. Other, and in the view 
of a growing number of stake-holders, more important aspects of drug control policies tend to 
be underrepresented in the UNODC’s reporting on drug control - generally in terms of 
activities and outputs - or are even completely ignored. This is particularly the case where, 
influenced by the structures of UN drug control framework, national level policy interventions 
result in a range of human rights violations (Barrett and Nowak, 2009).  Consequently, 
interconnected areas requiring attention, among others, can be seen to include: 
 
- The costs of drug control, especially in relation to enforcing drug control laws and the 
consequent opportunity costs incurred within related policy areas, such as health care 
services  
- Societal costs emerging from drug-related and drug control-related violence 
- Impacts of supply reduction efforts on rural livelihoods and development  
- Violations of human and indigenous rights caused by supply reduction efforts, 
including the use of violence and fumigation in crop eradication programmes 
- Violations of human rights caused by demand reduction efforts, including coerced 
treatment  
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- High rates of HIV and Hepatitis C among injecting drug users resulting from punitive 
laws, policies and policing practicing practices restricting or penalizing paraphernalia 
possession, opioid substitution therapy and other related harm reduction measures 
- Reduced availability of controlled medicines due to restrictions concerning the use of 
plants and pharmaceutical products containing internationally controlled substances 
(Bewley-Taylor, 2016, ICSDP 2016) 
 
Advocates, as well as some observers, of international drug control reform argue that the 
outcomes of drug policies can only be fully understood and adequately assessed when, 
these and similar dimensions of international drug control efforts are systematically 
documented and included in the reporting about its outcomes (Bewley-Taylor, 2016). A 
system that omits such metrics provides too narrow a perspective on the problem as well as 
on proposals to address it better.  
 
These proposed broader metrics might suffer from some of the same problems as those 
already in use. The e relate to the issues discussed above: difficulties in obtaining enough, 
valid and reliable data, producing meaningful estimates and, in some cases, finding or 
generating new metrics that measure what needs to be measured. Yet, even if these metrics, 
as well as others not mentioned here, are not necessary methodically superior to existing 
ones, they would complement a system of measurement that currently only provides a 
fragmentary and fractured (and methodically at least equally questionable) perspective on 
the outcomes of international drug control. Such additional and more directly outcome 
oriented evaluative indicators would permit policy-makers to assess not only the cost 
effectiveness of policy choices and related interventions, but also the performance of a 
state’s drug policy relative to human rights obligations emanating from other parts of the UN 
system.  
 
International development as an example for better practices of measuring outcomes 
 
The insight that measuring complex social outcomes of policies is a difficult endeavour is 
neither new nor unique to drug control,; although the nature of illicit markets certainly adds a 
degree of complexity (Andreas and Greenhill, 2010).  Indeed, the question how ‘reality’ can 
be best represented by a set of indicators is an epistemological problem prevailing in all 
social sciences and their practical applications, such as policy evaluation. Even the accuracy 
and relevance of prominent and long accepted metrics such as Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) as an approximation of the capacity of national economies have been challenged in 
recent years (Stiglitz et al, 2008).However, within the international realm there are policy 
areas in which this problem has been more seriously considered than in international drug 
control. In international development, for example, the 48 technical indicators complementing 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are often considered a good example of how 
policy goal measurement and metrics can be connected to provide policymakers with a 
realistic understanding of progress towards achieving stated objectives (Economist, 2015a).   
 
At the heart of the MDGs was the precise formulation of eight Goals, which included a 
benchmark (for example, ‘reducing extreme poverty by half’) and a time frame of 15 years.4 
While the establishment of target dates is not without its drawbacks, this made it possible to 
continuously collect relevant data that informed policymakers about the degree to which the 
MDGs were being achieved. Besides enabling periodic reviews of progress during the 
implementation process of the MDGs, their specific formulation and continuous data 
collection on them also made it more difficult for policy-makers to sweep the failure to 
achieve some of the MDGs under the carpet. It is also worth noting that measurement 
processes involved a range of actors, including national NGOs at a national level, rather than 
relying on a single UN entity that might have been minded to frame the data in a particular 
way for self-serving bureaucratic purposes.   
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That said, detailed formulation and benchmarking were unable to prevent the creation of 
policy goals that produced perverse incentives. Take, again, the example of extreme poverty.  
Because this was defined by the MDGs as an individual having to live with an income of less 
than $1 per day, cutting extreme poverty in half could have been achieved by increasing the 
income of half of those living in extreme poverty to $1.01 per day. Even if this did not 
significantly change the situation for most living under the poverty line, at least on paper, the 
reduction of extreme poverty would have been achieved through only minimal increases in 
income (Duflo and Banerjee, 2011).  Nonetheless, the existence of a definition of what 
extreme poverty meant ensured that advocates and member states possessed an additional 
instrument to point out such minimalist interpretations of the MDGs (Reddy and Kvangraven, 
2015). 
 
Within the field of international drug control, a similar mechanism incorporating a clear basket 
of objectives, or goals, and associated indicators remains absent.  Leaving aside inherent 
problems relating to the best way to reduce drug related harm, the goal formulated in the 
2009 political document currently guiding the implementation of international drug control and 
the related conventions remains vague in stating that the world drug problem should be 
eliminated or at least significantly reduced by 2019.5 Such a goal leaves ample room for 
interpretation, especially when – as argued above – appropriate metrics to fully assess the 
extent of the ‘world drug problem’ are missing.  
 
International drug control and the Sustainable Development Goals 
 
In 2016 the MDGs were superseded by the SDA and its associated set of SDGs, a similar 
framework aiming to guide international development efforts for the coming 15 years. In the 
long-term at least, the SDGs could prove instrumental in helping develop much needed 
clarity into the objectives of international drug control by assisting in shifting the focus of the 
metrics currently used to measure regime success. Indeed, aware of the debates around 
their construction and monitoring (IEAG, 2014, Economist 2015b,) if policy makers in 
international development take the SDGs as seriously as they did their predecessor 
framework, the Goals have the potential to help move drug control objectives away from 
those relating to simple market elimination towards the reduction of a range of drug and drug 
policy related harms within an overarching human development framework. This belief is 
premised on several related factors.   
 
First, drug control efforts are referred to directly in the SDGs in a number of places and can 
be seen to relate to many of the mutually reinforcing 17 Goals (and their 169 targets) in one 
way or another (Health Poverty Action, 2015, IDPC, 2016).  This opens the possibility that 
drug control can become an integrated part of efforts towards achieving the broader UN goal 
of human development rather than a stand-alone goal of the international community and an 
end in itself.  This potential connection is strengthened by the fact that the SDGs are also 
mentioned explicitly in a significant and recent UN soft law instrument on drug control.  
Although ostensibly preserving the extant regime in its current form, the UNGASS 2016 
Outcome Document welcomes the SDGs as ‘complementary and mutually reinforcing’ to 
drug control and, in terms of metrics and alternative development programmes, recommends 
‘the use of relevant human development indicators’ (UN, 2016)Second, at the operational 
level, since the SDA is a UN system-wide endeavour with comprehensive support, member 
states and the increasingly wide range of UN agencies engaging in various ways with the 
drug issue must clearly articulate how - in the case of countries - interventions and how - in 
the case of agencies - member state funded programmes contribute to the SDGs.  The 
precedence afforded human development within the UN system by the SDA consequently 
has the potential to invert the present situation whereby drug control efforts often take place 
with little or no concern for this cross-cutting issue. Within a more integrated and system-
Page 9 of 18 Drugs and Alcohol Today
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Drugs and Alcohol Today
 
 10
wide human development led policy environment a two-way process will be necessary.  This 
is the case in in terms of both drug supply and drug use. On the one hand, consideration 
must be given to the extent to which development efforts improve the lives of those involved 
in illicit markets.  On the other, drug control interventions must be carefully designed and 
evaluated to ensure that development objectives laid out in the SDGs are not subordinated to 
the narrow goals of an issue area silo dominated by activities and decisions in Vienna.  
 
As noted, there are numerous points of intersection between drug control policies and the 
SDGs. To explore some of these linkages and the kind of issues to be considered, here   four 
Goals are briefly examined.       
 
 
- SDG 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere 
Poverty is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon.  As such, its relationship to drug 
policy - in terms of both production and use - is manifold. At one level, poverty can be 
regarded as income based and, like the MDGs, the targets under this Goal include a 
financially focused definition of extreme poverty; in this case people living on less 
than $1.25 per day. Aware of the problems surrounding the use of such a figure as a 
success threshold, this conceptualization has particular resonance within parts of the 
world where illicit drug production is an important source of income. Traditional 
interventions focusing on shrinking illicit market volumes can result in reduced 
incomes for those engaged in drug producing activities. Moreover, in many instances 
alternative development programmes have not been successful in replacing illicit 
sources of income with those that are licit. An approach more in line with the reality of 
illicit drug producing countries would have to consider the costs and benefits of supply 
reduction efforts in terms of the broader national and regional economic development 
efforts. When the concept of poverty is expanded to include vulnerability, 
incorporating among other things, access to basic services and susceptibility to shock 
(including violence and conflict), potential intersections multiply.  This is the case for 
individuals and communities across the spectrum of illicit drug market activities.     
 
- SDG 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote 
sustainable agriculture 
Clearly, in many respects this is closely related to Goal 1. In this instance, although 
complex relationships exist between relatively wealthy land owners and the ‘land 
poor’, it is often the case that low agricultural productivity and a lack of infrastructure 
in some parts of the world leads rural populations to turn to illicit drug production. 
Carefully designed and implemented measures aiming to increase productivity and 
improve access to markets for goods and produce other than illicit drug crops are 
likely to help reduce poverty, improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture in 
many traditional producer states.  Goal 2 is also important in terms of the correct 
sequencing of development programmes and related transitions from illicit crops. A 
lack of viable alternatives to drug crops increases food insecurity among rural 
communities and in turn can lead to worsening nutrition.    
 
- SDG 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for all at all ages 
Of all the SDGs, this has the most explicit connection to drug policy.  Indeed, Target 
3.5 relates to the strengthening of prevention and treatment of ‘substance’ abuse, 
including ‘narcotic drug abuse’.  Others (3.3 and 3.7 respectively) focus on the 
elimination of epidemics, including AIDS - in which injection drug use plays an 
important role outside sub-Saharan Africa - and ensuring universal access to 
controlled medicines, which includes products used in opioid substitution therapy as 
well as palliative care. Beyond these areas of concern, and as with most Goals, an 
interest in ensuring healthy lives and the promotion of wellbeing straddle not only the 
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SDG boundaries themselves, but also transcend traditional producer-consumer state 
boundaries in complex ways. For example, in a drug producing country like 
Afghanistan drug crop eradication and associated bans can have wide-reaching 
negative impacts on the health and wellbeing of individuals and communities.  
 
- SDG 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, 
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive 
institutions at all levels.  
Among others, targets for this Goal are concerned with the reduction of violent 
deaths, organised criminality, corruption and illegal financial flows; all phenomena 
that are often related to illicit drug markets. The inflated value of certain drugs 
resulting from their prohibition for anything other than medical and scientific purposes 
ensures that the market contributes substantially to global illegal financial flows while 
in many in regions – some more than others -  drug markets contribute to excess 
violence as well as high homicide rates, levels of corruption and a lack of rule of law. 
Another dimension to be considered here concerns the commitment of development 
donors to fragile and conflict affected states. Since many of these nations, or more 
usually sub-national regions, experience both high levels of poverty and illicit drug 
economies, in-country programming needs to be sensitive to local circumstances and 
alert to potential negative consequences.  
 
As this limited discussion reveals, intersections between drug policy and the SDGs are 
numerous and complex. Related measurement and evaluation efforts will, therefore, certainly 
be challenging in many instances.  This is especially the case when, moving beyond drug 
policy outcomes, consideration is given to how drug markets themselves impact populations.  
Nonetheless, for these and other relevant SDGs and Targets, when it comes to measuring 
drug policy outcomes focus needs to be moved away from a narrow conception of effects on 
the scale of and flows within and between drug markets. Rather, what needs to be measured 
is the contribution of international drug control to the achievement of the SDGs more broadly.  
 
In this sense, besides its symbolic value, the inclusion of some drug-related issues in the 
SDGs also has the potential to stimulate – or increase -  the interest and involvement of UN 
agencies not traditionally concerned with the issue of drug control. The body with primarily 
responsibility to assist with the implementation of the international drug control conventions, 
the UNODC, is sometimes accused of conservativism since it has an incentive to preserve 
the drug control system, and consequently how it is measured, in its present form.; a 
situation by no means unique to this issue area. It is plausible to suggest, however, that 
necessary attention to the SDGs has the potential to break down any rigidity that may exist in 
this regard.  That said, other UN agencies such as the UNDP – but also the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), which appears to be an increasingly prominent actor within the regime 
as drug related health issues become more actively promoted through not only the SDGs but 
also a shift in focus in venues like the CND – might also have a different perspective on the 
outcomes and impacts of drug control.  Furthermore, decision-making processes within these 
agencies are likely to be driven by power dynamics and political imperatives that differ from 
those prevailing in Vienna, at both the CND and within the UNODC. Such a situation may 
help change how some of the more contested issues in international drug control – such as 
human rights or harm reduction – are viewed, measured and approached by UN member 
states. Added to this, a system-wide approach to drug control guided by the SDGs would 
generate a situation whereby all agencies would have to account for the outcomes of their 
programming in relation to human development rather than their own organisational targets. 
To be sure, within both agencies and member states, in many instances current metrics can 
be seen to distort policy responses and encourage short term measures; measures that often 
focus on the metrics themselves rather than dealing with the causes of drug related 
problems.   
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Considering the SDG framework has only been in place since the beginning of 2016, it 
remains to be seen how the Goals might influence the implementation of international drug 
control policies. However, in terms of measuring outcomes, their potential to provoke 
changes in perspective appears considerable.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The Outcome Document of the UNGASS on the world drug problem reiterates what other 
international declarations of the past decades have defined as the dominant approach to 
international drug control: if demand for and, particularly, supply of illicit drugs are reduced  
the ‘world drug problem’ can be solved. As discussed here, the SDGs arguably offer the 
international community a chance to shift towards  a more holistic perspective on drugs and 
drug control: one that is more concerned with a broader social goal (i.e. human development) 
rather than simply striving for the elimination  of illicit markets for certain psychoactive 
substances. . Despite including references to the SDGs, in large parts the Document 
promotes more of the same in drug control rather than a substantive shift in outlook. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly bearing in mind the age and lineage of the extant regime, international drug 
control’s narrow, and to borrow David Mansfield’s phrase, ‘drug fetishism’ has remained in 
place (Mansfield 2016).  
 
Recent engagement by the UN Statistical Commission with the issue of drug policy metrics is 
certainly promising in terms of signalling a more integrated UN system approach to the issue, 
with a developing connection between ‘Statcomm’ and the CND reflecting, among other 
things, an increasingly widespread awareness of the relevance of the SDA to drug policy 
(UN, 2016a).  Nonetheless, efforts to improve the current data sets (UN, 2016a) as well as 
enhance the poor response and completion rates of the ARQ (Bewley-Taylor and Hallam, 
2016) do little to move beyond the regime’s longstanding preoccupation with flows within and 
the scale of the illicit market.  Celebrating its seventieth Anniversary, the 2017 Statistical 
Commission operated under the banner, ‘Better Data, Better Lives.’ When it comes to 
international drug policy, it might be argued that phrase should be modified to read ‘Better 
and Different Data, Better Lives.’  Indeed, it will be interesting to see how member states, the 
actors that ultimately drive and agree on the direction and form of data collection processes, 
move towards an expansion of scope necessary to generate genuine synergy between 
international drug policy and the SDA. The challenges are numerous, in terms of cost, 
technical capabilities and differing perspectives and imperatives of regime members, 
particularly on an issue such as human rights.  It would be naïve to assume otherwise and to 
underestimate the many complex barriers to change.  Yet, the issue becomes more pressing 
and difficult to ignore with the rapid approach of the next high-level meeting on drugs in 
2019.  Then the international community will review progress made towards achieving the 
objectives of the 2009 Political Declaration and, as things stand, agree a new soft law 
instrument outlining how the regime should operate over the following decade or so.  At that 
point, as well as having to explain, or side-step, a lack of genuine progress in achieving the 
goals of the 2009 instrument, states will also be required to set new objectives and 
accompanying measurement frameworks.  It consequently seems timely to build upon and 
develop emerging discussions around the integration of drug policy metrics with those linked 
to the SDGs; a process that should include an appraisal and revision of the ARQ.   
 
Within this context, and hoping to contribute to the ongoing negotiations about the form and 
focus of the 2019 high-level review, this article has aimed to demonstrate the role of metrics 
in sustaining the formal shape and normative character of the global drug prohibition regime 
and the potential of concepts, approaches and indicators from other parts of the UN system 
to instigate change and modernisation.  Moreover, in so doing it is hoped that, in helping to 
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fill a space in the IR literature, the research and ideas herein will contribute to and encourage 
discussion about regime and related norm stasis and transformation more generally. This 
seems a worthwhile endeavour since, as Peter Haas noted a few years ago, ‘regime analysis 
is truly part of a long-term research program that analyses the impact of ideas and material 
factors on international cooperation, and their interplay’ (Haas, 2013).    
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